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STAGGERED CONTRACTS AND BUSINESS
CYCLE PERSISTENCE
Kevin X.D. Huang and Zheng Liu

ABSTRACT

Staggered price and staggered wage contracts are commonly viewed as similar mechanisms
in generating persistent real effects of monetary shocks. In this paper, we distinguish the two
mechanisms in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. We show that, although the
dynamic price setting and wage setting equations are alike, a key parameter governing persistence
is linked to the underlying preferences and technologies in different ways. Under the staggered wage
mechanism, an intertemporal smoothing incentive in labor supply creates a real rigidity that is absent
under the staggered price mechanism.

Consequently, the two mechanisms have different

implications on persistence. While the staggered price mechanism by itself does not contribute to,
the staggered wage mechanism plays an important role in generating persistence.
JEL classification: E24, E32, E52
Key words:

staggered contracts, business cycle persistence, monetary policy
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STAGGERED CONTRACTS AND BUSINESS
CYCLE PERSISTENCE*

1

Introduction

How monetary policy shocks affect business cycle duration has been a challenging issue concerning
economists and policy makers. Recent empirical studies such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1999) reveal that monetary shocks can have long-lasting effects on real activities. Yet, it has been a
difficult task to identify monetary transmission mechanisms that can contribute to generating such
effects.l

In a seminal paper, Taylor (1980) proposes a staggered wage mechanism to help solve this
persistence issue. In his model, nominal wages are set in a staggered fashion. That is, not all wage
decisions are made at the same time, and each wage, after being set, is fixed for a short period of time
such as a year. As summarized in Taylor (1999), there is much empirical evidence that price contracts
and wage contracts are staggered. Taylor (1980) shows that this staggered wage mechanism can lead
to endogenous wage inertia and thereby persistence in employment movements following a temporary
shock. He states the intuition as follows:
Because of the staggering, some firms will have established their wage rates prior to the
current negotiations, but others will establish their wage rates in future periods. Hence, when
considering relative wages, firms and unions must look both forward and backward in time to
see what other workers will be paid during their own contract period. In effect, each contract
is written relative to other contracts, and this causes shocks to be passed on from one contract
to another ... contract formation in this model generates an inertia of wages which parallels
the persistence of unemployment.
More recently, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (CKM) (1998) carry this intuition to a general
equilibrium environment. but perhaps surprisingly, they find that a staggered price mechanism by itself
cannot generate persistent real effects following monetary shocks, an apparent puzzle in light of
Taylor's insights. There are two interpretations of this puzzle. On one hand, CKM (1998) suggest that
it is difficult to explain persistence based on staggered nominal contracts in a general equilibrium
framework, and "we should look elsewhere for mechanisms to generate persistence." On the other hand,
Taylor (1999) conjectures that, "the findings of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1998) may indicate
*We are grateful to Olivier Blanchard, V.V. Chari, Peter Ireland, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Narayana Kocherlakota, Lee
Ohanian, and Louis Phaneuf for very useful conversations on this subject. Our work is also benefited from conversations with
Lawrence Christiano, Bill Duper, Patrick Kehoe, Ellen McGrattan, and Michael Parkin. Previous versions of this paper have
been presented at Boston College, Brandeis University, Clark University, CREFE at UQAM, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, the University of Minnesota, the University of Western Ontario, Utah State University, and the Econometric
Society 1999 Winter Meeting. We thank the seminar participants for comments. We are especially grateful to the Research
Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for providing excellent research support when we were visiting there.
The usual disclaimer applies.
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that the monopolistic competition (stationary market power) model may not be sufficient as a

microeconomic foundation." Behind the two arguments seems to be a common perception that
a staggered price mechanism and a staggered wage mechanism are embodied with the same
implications on persistence: either that they both contribute to generating persistence or that
neither does

SO.2

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a third interpretation of the persistence puzzle. We
find that a general equilibrium model along the line of CKM (1998), incorporating staggered
wage contracts rather than staggered price contracts, is able to generate substantial persistence. Thus , staggered wage contracts are an important contributing mechanism in generating
persistent real effects of monetary shocks, even when the underlying wage setting rule is derived frorn the standard monopolistic competition framework. The two models have different
implications on persistence because, in a

ge~eral

equilibrium environment, the key parameter

that governs persistence in the dynamic price setting and the dynamic wage setting equations
is a function of the underlying preferences and technologies of the economy. Although the two
equations are apparently identical, this functional form and thereby the value of the persistence
parameter differ across the two mechanisms.
To facilitate the comparison of the two mechanisms, we construct two models in a symmetric
J

way. The first rnodel features perfectly competitive goods markets, monopolistically competitive labor markets, and households endowed with differentiated labor skills setting nominal
wages. The second model, on the other hand, features perfectly competitive labor markets,
monopolistically competitive goods markets, and firms producing differentiated goods setting
prices. In the spirit of Taylor (1980), we assume that wages and prices are set in a staggered
fashion. 3 Following the lead of CKM (1998), we derive the wage setting and the price setting
rules from households' and firms' optimizing decisions and thus link these decision rules to
the underlying preferences and technologies in the models. We show that a critical parameter governing persistence is the elasticity of relative wage (or price) with respect to aggregate
demand in the wage (or price) equation. A greater value of this parameter corresponds to
less persistence, because it implies a larger response of wage (or price) decisions to aggregate
demand shocks, and thus a faster adjustment of wage (or price) index and a quicker return
of aggregate output to steady state. Under the staggered wage mechanism, the value of this
parameter is necessarily less than one, and decreases with both the elasticity of substitution
among differentiated labor skills in the production technology 'and the degree of relative risk
aversion in labor hours in households' preferences. In contrast, the value of this parameter
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under the staggered price mechanism is necessarily greater than one, and increases with the
degree of relative risk aversion in labor hours. Consequently, a staggered wage mechanism
tends to generate persistence but a staggered price mechanism does not.
To understand the driving forces of these results, we compare the optimal responses of
households and firms to a monetary shock in the two models. In the staggered wage model,
imperfectly competitive households choose nominal wages to balance the expected marginal
utility of leisure and of wage income during their contract periods, taking into account the
effects of the wage decisions on the demand for their labor services and thus their wage incomes as well. When an expansionary monetary shock occurs, wage index does not increase
proportionally due to staggering in wage setting. Price level does not fully rise either since
profit maximization requires that price equal marginal cost determined by wage index. Therefore, real aggregate demand increases , raising both households ' income and firms ' demand for
labor services. The higher income reduces the households' marginal utility of income and the
higher labor dernand raises their marginal utility of leisure. Utility maximization requires that
households who can renew contracts raise wages to rebalance their marginal utility of income
and of leisure. We find that the optimal percentage increase in relative wages is necessarily less
than the percentage increase in aggregate demand. The reason is that a higher relative wage
reduces both the demand for the corresponding type of labor services (substitution effect) and
the associated wage income (income effect). These effects both serve to restore the balance
between the marginal utility of income and of leisure. Thus the optimal increase in relative
wages is small. Consequently, wage index rises slowly, and movements in aggregate output and
employment , after their initial responses to the shock, are also slow and persistent. Moreover,
the easier to substitute across labor skills and the more willing the households to smooth labor
hours, the smaller the optimal wage adjustment, and thus the larger the output persistence.
If we measure the magnitude of persistence by the ratio of output response at the end of the

initial contract duration to that in the impact period (i.e. , a "contract multiplier" ), this ratio
is about 40% under our calibrated parameter values.
The staggered price rnechanism works differently. Under this mechanisrn, imperfectly competitive firms choose prices to maximize expected profits during their contract periods, taking
into account the effects of the price decisions on the demand for their goods and thus their
revenues as well. We show that the optimal price is a linear function of a firm's expected

j
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marginal costs during its contract periods. Thus a higher price will be set if the firm is expecting higher marginal costs. Staggered price setting allows an expansionary monetary shock
to raise real aggregate dernand and thus firms' demand for labor services. On the other hand,
following the shock, households receive more real income, and consequently they are willing to
work less at each given real wage. The outward shift of labor demand curve and the inward
shift of labor supply curve both serve to drive up real wage and thus the real marginal cost of
production. If households prefer smoothed labor hours, the equilibrium percentage increase in
real wage will exceed the increase in aggregate demand, causing marginal cost to rise by more
than aggregate demand does. In response, profit-maximizing firms will fully adjust their prices
whenever they have the chance to renew contracts. Consequently, movements in aggregate
output and employment, after their initial responses to the shock, are fast and transitory. In
contrast to the staggered wage model, the contract multiplier is here negative for reasonable
parameter values.
In the literature, there are three strands of research work that are related to ours. The
first strand is the staggered price contract literature centering on the CKM (1998) persistence
puzzle. For exarnple, Bergin and Feenstra (1998) show that adding a non-CES production function and factor specificity to a staggered price model can contribute to generating persistence;
Kiley (1997) dernonstrates that assuming a high degree of increasing returns at individual firm
level can help produce persistence in a staggered price model; and Gust (1997) emphasizes the
importance of constraining factor mobility across sectors. The second strand of literate related
to our work is the state-dependent pricing literature. Dotsey, King, and Wolrnan (1999) provide a general equilibrium framework for analyzing the implications of state-dependent price
setting rules. Dotsey, et. al (1997) show that staggered price setting can arise from small
menu costs, and incorporating variable capacity utilization in such a model is a promising
mechanism in delivering persistence. The third strand is the nominal wage contract literature.
Following the seminal work of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Blanchard (1986), attempts
have been made to model staggered wage contracts in a dynamic general equilibrium environment. For example) Erceg (1997) analyzes a model with both staggered price and staggered
wage contracts and studies the role of this double staggering mechanism in propagating monetary shocks, while Huang and Liu (1999) show that adding a staggered price rnechanism on
top of a staggered wage mechanism does not help magnify persistence. The recent work by

j
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Cho, Cooley, and Phaneuf (1997) evaluates the welfare effect of nominal wage contracts. In
summary, there has been a renewed interest in identifying monetary propagation mechanisms
within the framework of staggered nominal contracts. Yet, little has been done to explore the
microstructures that may distinguish the staggered wage mechanism from the staggered price
mechanism. In this paper, we distinguish the two mechanisms in their capabilities of generating
persistence. It is important to emphasize that we do not attempt to propose a single friction
model that is able to fully account for the dynamic output responses to monetary shocks. In
fact, the recent work by Christiano , et. al (1997) suggests that it is unlikely for a single-friction
model to provide a complete account of the real effects of monetary shocks. To provide such an
account, a combination of frictions is required. Our work suggests that , in such a multi-friction
model, staggered wage contracts can be an important contributing mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates Taylor's (1980) original
intuition and briefly describes the CKM (1998) persistence puzzle. Section 3 and 4 present
two general equilibrium models with staggered wage and with staggered price contracts, respectively, and use analytical solutions to distinguish the two mechanisms in their potentials
of generating persistence. Section 5 evaluates the quantitative implications of the two mechanisms based on two calibrated models with capital. Section 6 concludes the paper. The models
with capital are described in the. Appendix.

2

J

Taylor's Insights and the CKM Persistence Puzzle

In this section, we use a simplified version of Taylor's (1980) model to illustrate his original
intuition. We then describe the CKM (1998) persistence puzzle to motivate our present work.

2.1

A Simple Model in the Spirit of Taylor (1980)

Consider an economy in which, as in Taylor (1980), prices are set for N periods and remain
fixed during these "contract periods," where N > 1. In each period, a fraction liN of firms
can set prices , and in doing so, they take into account the prevailing price which, at any point
of time, is an average of the N contractual prices determined in the current and the previous

N - 1 periods. Therefore, when setting new prices, firms look at both the future and the past
price decisions because these are part of the prevailing price. When N

= 2, the price setting

6
rule is fully described by the following equations:
1
Pt = 2"(Xt

1
Xt = 2"(Pt

+ Xt-d,

(1)

r
+ Etpt+d + 2(Yt + EtYt+d + et,

(2)

where Xt denotes the price decision, Pt the prevailing price level, Yt the aggregate output, and
E t is a conditional expectation operator. All variables are in log-terms , and et is a shock

to price setting. The parameter

r measures

the responsiveness of price decisions to changes

in aggregate demand conditions. The system can be closed by assuming a money demand
equation Yt

= mt - Pt· To focus on monetary shocks, we set et = 0. The model can then be

reduced to a second order difference equation in Xt by substituting for Pt and Yt using (1) and
the money demand equation, respectively. Under an additional assumption that the money
stock mt follows a random walk process, a simple solution to this difference equation can be
obtained , and the implied dynamic output equation is given by
Yt = aYt-l

l+a

+ -2-(mt - mt-d,

where

a =

Two special cases are worth mentioning: if r = 1, then a =

vtr .
1 + vtr

1-

°

(3)

and there is no persistence;

if

r

r

corresponds to a larger a and hence more output persistence. Taylor (1980, 1999) notes

= 0, then

a

= 1 and the output follows a random walk process. In general, a smaller

that the autoregressive output process arises from the staggering in price setting. Therefore,
a model with staggered price contracts can potentially generate large amount of persistence,

r is small.
original setup, r is a structural parameter void

provided that the key parameter
In Taylor's (1980)

of any distinctions be-

tween price setting and wage setting, and the above arguments apply to both mechanisms with
the corresponding notations being appropriately interpreted.

2.2

The CKM (1998) Persistence Puzzle

CKM (1998) carry Taylor'S (1980) intuition to a general equilibrium business cycle model with
staggered price contracts , and thereby link the parameter r to underlying economic fundamentals such as preferences and technologies. However, they find that there is no persistence in
output dynamics because the rnagnitude of

r so determined is too large for empirically plau-

sible values of preference and technology parameters. CKM (1998) test the sensitivity of this

/
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result by including various features such as convex demand curve, specific factor of production,
and zero-income-effect utility function, and find the result robust.
There are two different interpretations of this persistence puzzle. On one side, it is inferred
that staggered nominal contracts may not be an important contributing mechanism in generating persistence in a general equilibrium setup. On the other side, it is conjectured that
the conventional monopolistic competition framework may not be adequate for deriving the
price setting equation. This puzzle has stimulated much research in combining various other
mechanisms with the staggered price mechanism to lower the value of ry.
In this paper, we reassess the persistence puzzle from a different perspective. We realize
that, with optimizing individuals, a staggered wage mechanism, after all, may be quite different from a staggered pTice mechanisln in generating persistence. Our finding is that such
a difference does exist because the paralneter ry is determined by different economic forces in
models with the two mechanisms. Such fine distinctions cannot possibly be uncovered unless
the optimizing behaviors of households and firms are explicitly modeled.

3

A Model with Staggered Wage Contracts

In this section, we describe a general equilibrium model with staggered wage contracts. In the
/

model economy, there is a large number of infinitely-lived households who are endowed with
differentiated labor skills indexed in the interval [0,1], and there is a large number of identical
firms who use all types of the labor services to produce a homogeneous consumption good. In
each period t, the economy experiences a realization of shocks St, while the history of events

== (so, ... ,St) with probability 1f(st). The initial realization So is given.
Production technology is given by Y(st) = L(st), where L(st) = [J~1 L(i, st) O"~l di] O"~l is a

up to date t is st

Dixit-Stiglitz (1970) type of composite of labor services. In the production function, L(i, st) is
the labor service provided by household i at st, and
different types of labor services, where

(J

>

(J

is the elasticity of substitution among

l.

Firms behave competitively. Upon the realization of st, they choose output Y(st) and
labor services {L(i, st)}iE(0,1) to maximize profit P(st)Y(st) - f01 W(i, st)L(i, st)di, subject
to the production technology, taking price P(st) and wages {W(i, st)hE(0,1) as given. The
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resulting demand function for the labor service of type i is

(4)
where W(st) =

P(st)

[101W(i, st)l-O"

di] 1/(1-0") is a wage index. Zero-profit condition implies that

= W(st).

Households are price-takers in goods markets and monopolistic competitors in labor markets. They take the labor demand schedule (4) as given and set wages in a staggered fashion. In
particular, in each period t, there is a fraction liN of households that can set new wages upon
the realization of st. Once a wage is set, it has to remain fixed for N periods. We sort the indices of households so that those indexed by i E [0, liN] set wages in periods t, t+N, t+2N,···,
those indexed by i E (1/ N, 2/N] set wages in periods t + 1, t + N

+ 1, t + 2N + 1, ... , and so on.

Household i has a utility function
00

Ui

== L L,Bt1f(st){log(C*(i, st)) + V(L(i, st))},
t=O

where C* ('i) = [bC (i)V

+ (1

st

- b)(M (i) / P)V] l/v is a CES composite of consumption and real

money balances, and V(·) is a strictly decreasing and strictly concave function. Upon the
realization of st, the household solves its utility maximization problem by choosing consumption

C(i, st), nominal money balances M(i, st), and one-period nominal bond holdings B(i, st+1),
taking prices P(st) and D(st+1Ist) as given. If the household is a member of the cohort that
can set new wages, it also chooses a nominal wage W (i, st) for the current and the next N - 1
periods, taking the labor demand schedule (4) as given. The utility maximization is subject
to a sequence of budget constraints

and a borrowing constraint B(i, st) 2::

-B

for some large positive number

B,

for each st, with

initial conditions M(i, S-l) and B(i, sO) given. Here B(i, st+1) is a one-period nominal bond
that costs D(st+1Ist) dollars in st and pays off one dollar in the next period if st+1 is realized,
II( i, st) is the household's claim to firms' profits, and T( i, st) is a nominal transfer to the
household.

J
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To close the description of the model, we need to specify a monetary policy. We assume
that newly created money is equally distributed to all households via lump-sum transfers so
that J~l T(i, st) di

=

M(st) - M(st-l).

An equilibrium in this economy consists of a set of allocations C(i, st), M(i, st), B(i, st+l)
for each household i, and Y(st) and {L(i, st)}iE[O,l] for firms, together with prices D(st+llst),

P(st), W(st), and {W(i, st)}iE [O,l] that satisfy the following conditions: (i) taking prices as
given, firms ' allocations solve their profit maximization problem; (ii) taking prices and all
wages but its own as given, each household's allocations and wage solve its utility maximization
problem; (iii) goods market, money market, and bond market clear; and (iv) monetary policy
is as specified.
In what follows, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all households in a given
cohort make identical wage decisions.

Since there are complete contingent bond markets

and consumption and leisure are additively-separable in the utility function, equilibrium consumption flows and real money balances are identical across all households. 4 Combining this
observation with the market clearing conditions, we have C(i, st)

M(i, st)

=

P(st)Y(st)

= C(st) = Y(st)

and

M(st) for all i. To help exposition, we impose a static money demand function
=

M(st) for now and relax this assumption in Section 5.

To see how the staggered wage mechanism can help generate persistence, we consider first
J

the case with no staggering, that is, with N

=

1. The first order condition with respect to

household i's wage decision implies that
(J
(J -

-V[(i,st)
1 Uc(i, st) ,

(5)

where - Vz(i , st) and Uc(i, st) are the household's marginal utility of leisure and of consumption,
respectively. Equation (5) says that the optimal real wage (or relative wage since P =

W in

equilibrium) is a constant "markup" over the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption. When the rnarginal utility of leisure rises, the household increases its wage to
reduce the demand for its labor services; when the marginal utility of consumption increases,
the household lowers its wage to raise its labor income and consumption. 5 With N

=

1,

all households make identical wage decisions in a symmetric equilibrium so that W (i, st)

W(st) = P(st) and L(i, st) = L(st). The real wage is thus always constant and a monetary
shock only results in a proportionally higher price level, leaving all real variables unchanged.
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In the case with staggered wage decisions, i.e., with N > 1, however, the situation is
different. As a cohort of households makes ·wage decisions, the rest N - 1 cohorts cannot set
new wages. Thus, when a household raises its wage, it also raises its relative wage, resulting
in a lower demand for its labor services and a lower wage income given that

(J

>

1. Before

turning to the N-period wage setting rule, we develop first a quantitative measure of the
contemporaneous response of relative wage to a given aggregate demand shock, assuming that
each household takes wage index as given in making wage decisions and there is no forwardor backward-looking effects. These assumptions are to be relaxed later. Notice that (5) can
be rewritten as

(6)
where we have used the zero-profit condition P(st) = W(st), the labor demand equation
(4), the money demand equation P(st)Y(st) = M(st), and the market clearing condition

C(i, st) = Y(st) = L (st) for all i.
Suppose that there is now an expansionary monetary shock. Since the wage index does
not rise proportionally due to the staggering, the real aggregate demand rises. If household
i's relative wage remained constant, the demand for its labor services Ld(i, st) and thus its
marginal utility of leisure would rise. Utility maximization requires that the household raise
its wage to maintain (6). The equilibrium relative wage is a fixed point of the function f(x, Y)
b(O"~l)

{-Vi

[x-O"Y]} Y with respect to x

==

== W/W. To see how much the relative wage has to

be raised in response to a given demand shock, we take total differentiation of (6) to obtain
the elasticity of the relative wage with respect to the aggregate output
fx,Y

where

(J

==

dx Y
1+~
dY -;; = 1 + (J~'

(7)

is the elasticity of substitution among different types of labor services, and

VilL( i) /Vi measures the household's relative risk aversion in labor hours. Given that
and

~

> 0, two observations are worth mentioning in light of (7). First,

fx,Y

(J

~

==

>1

is less than one.

Thus a one percent change in aggregate output results in a less-than-one percent change in
relative wage. Second,

fx ,Y

decreases in both

(J

and~.

These observations are the key to

understanding the model's potentials in generating persistence.
The above findings are fairly intuitive. Since there is an intertemporal smoothing incentive
in labor supply, i.e.,

~

> 0, a larger

(J

implies a smaller wage adjustment in response to the

J
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shock. This is so because, when it is easier to substitute one type of labor for another, a given

relative wage adjustment is associated with a larger employment fluctuation. On the other
hand, given that a is larger than one, a stronger incentive of a household to smooth its labor
hours (i.e., a higher e) makes it less willing to adjust its relative wage.
We now analyze the N-period wage setting rule, with the intertemporal forward- and
backward-looking effects taken into account. The first order condition with respect to the
N-period wage decision implies that

Wist
(,

where 7r( ST 1st)

=

)

2:~~'i - l2:sr,6T-t7r(sTlst)(-Vi(i,sT))Ld(i,sT)
a - 12:~~'i-1 2: sr ,6T- t7r(sTlst)[Uc (i, ST)/ P (sT)]Ld(i, ST)'

_a_

= 7r( ST) / 7r( st) is the conditional probability of ST given st, for

T

2: t. Hence,

the household's optimal wage is a constant "markup" over the ratio of weighted marginal
utilities of leisure to those of income over the contract periods, where the weights are given
by normalized quantities dernanded for its labor services. Clearly, this equation reduces to (5)
when N = 1.
To gain further insights into this wage decision rule, it is helpful to examine the loglinearized version of the wage setting equation
Wt =

N-1

N-1

N- 1

j=l

j=l

j=O

:L bjwt-j + E t :L bjwt+j + N ~ 1E t :L Yt+j,

(8)
J

where the lower-case variables denote log-deviations of the corresponding upper-case variables
from their steady state values, E t is a conditional expectation operator, and the event argument

st is replaced by the time subscript t to save notation. We have also set ,6 = 1 to simplify the
expressions. The weights on lagged and forward wages in (8) are given by

bj =

NfN-J 1), and

the coefficient in front of current and future outputs is given by

(9)
where ( is the household's steady state relative risk aversion in labor hours. Accordingly, , is
the steady state counterpart of

Ex,Y.

Equation (8) is apparently identical to Taylor's (1980) structural equation, except that the
parameter, in his rnodel is a structural parameter, while it is here a parameter determined
by the underlying preferences and technologies. It is clear from (8) that when a household sets
a new wage, it looks at both the wages set in the previous N - 1 periods and those expected

12
to be set in the future N - 1 periods. Since bj is declining in j, the household assigns lower
weights to those wages set either in the further past or in the further future. This backwardand forward-looking consideration implies that the household would like to keep in line with
the peers when deciding on its own wage, as emphasized by Taylor (1980).
More importantly, a household that can set a new wage takes into account changes in
aggregate demand conditions during its contract periods.

The parameter ry measures the

responsiveness of the household's wage to such changes. A smaller ry implies a slower wage
adjustment, and thus more output persistence. Equation (9) shows that ry depends on both
the elasticity of substitution among differentiated labor skills and the steady state relative
risk aversion in labor hours. Given that (

>

0 and a

>

1, ry is necessarily less than one and

decreases with both ( and a. Thus the staggered wage mechanism can potentially contribute
to generating persistence. 6
To illustrate the role of ry in helping generate persistence, we derive analytical solutions of
equilibrium output dynamics in the case with N = 2. Equation (8) then simplifies t0 7

Combining this equation with the log-linearized money demand equation Pt + Yt = mt, and the
zero-profit condition Pt

=

Wt

=

(Wt

+ Wt-d/2,

we obtain a second order difference equation in

Wt
EtWt+l -

2(1 +ry)
1
Wt
-ry

+ Wt-l

2ry
1-ry

= ---Et(mt

+ mt+l).

With an additional assumption that mt follows a random walk process, the solution of this
difference equation is Wt = aWt-l

+ (1 -

a)mt. The implied dynamic output equation is given

by (3), as in the simplified version of Taylor'S (1980) model. The only difference is that the key
persistence parameter

r

is here determined by preference and technology parameters ( and

(J,

as described in (9).

4

A Model with Staggered Price Contracts

In this section, we present a general equilibrium model with staggered price contracts. As
will be shown, the dynamic price setting equation in this model is apparently identical to
the dynamic wage setting equation in the staggered wage model presented above. However,

/
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the elasticity of relative price with respect to aggregate output, the counterpart of 'Y in the
previous model, is here linked to the underlying economic fundamentals in a different way, and
the model is not able to deliver any persistence for reasonable parameter values.
The model is a simplified version of CKM (1998). To be specific, there is a continuum
of firms who use homogeneous labor services to produce differentiated goods indexed in the
interval [0, 1], and there is a representative household who supplies the labor and consumes a
composite of all types of the goods.
The household 's utility function is given by
00

U
where C*(st) = [bC(st)V

=

+ (1 -

LL,BtJr(st)log(C*(st)) + V(L(st)),
t=O st
b)(M(st)jP(st))V]l/V is a CES composite of consumption and

real money balances , V(-) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave, P(st) is a price index, and
e

C(st)

=

[J~l Y(j, st) elil dj] ~ == Y(st) is a composite of all types of differentiated goods. Here,

Y(j, st) is the output of firm j at st, and () is the elasticity of substitution arnong different
types of goods, where () > 1.
Upon the realization of st, the household solves the utility maximization problem by
choosing consumption goods {Y(j, st)}jE[O,lj, nominal money balances M(st), and one-period
nominal bond holdings B(st+1), taking prices {P(j,st)hE[O,lj and D(st+1Ist), and nominal
wage W (st) as given. The utility maximization is subject to a sequence of budget constraints

1
r
P(j, st)Y(j, st)dj + L
J
o

D(st+1Ist)B(st+1) + M(st)

st+l

:S W(st)L(st) + l1(st) + B(st) + M(st-1) + T(st),
and a borrowing constraint similar to that in Section 3. From the first order conditions we
derive the demand function for good j

t)

Y d (.
), S

=
(

P (j, s t )
P(st)

)-8

Y ( t)
S

,

(10)

and the optimal labor supply decision
(11)
1

where P(st) =

(J01 P(j,st)l- edj) T=e

is the price index.

J

Production technology for firm j is given by Y(j, st) =
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L(j, st), where L(j, st) is the labor

used by j at st. Firms are price-takers in labor markets and monopolistic competitors in goods
markets. They take the goods demand schedule (10) as given and set prices in a staggered
fashion. All finns are divided into N cohorts based on the timing of their price setting. Upon
the realization of st, a firm j that can set a new price solves an N-period profit maximization
problem
t+N-l

Maxp(j ,st )

L

T=t

LD(STlst) [P(j,st) - W(ST)] yd(j,ST),
ST

subject to (10). The resulting optimal pricing rule is given by

P . st _ _
8_ 2:~~~-l2:S1" D(ST lst)P(ST)OW(ST)Y(ST)
(), ) - 8 - 1
2:~~~-1 2:S1" D(STlst)P(ST)OY(ST)
Thus the firm's optimal price is a markup over a weighted average of the marginal costs during
its contract periods, where the marginal costs are given by the nominal wages since labor is
the only input.
Assuming that monetary policy and money demand equation are the same as in the staggered wage model, we can define an equilibrium analogously. In what follows, we focus on a
symmetric equilibrium in which firms in the same cohort make identical price decisions. The
main finding is that marginal cost always changes more than aggregate output does in response
to a shock, and thus a firm always fully adjusts its price whenever it gets the chance to set a
new price. In consequence, price level changes quickly, and aggregate output returns to steady
state as soon as every firm gets the chance to renew its contract.
To understand this no-persistence result, it is essential to understand how equilibrium real
wage, the real marginal cost in this model, responds to changes in aggregate output. For this
purpose, we rewrite the labor supply equation (11) as

(12)
The labor demand function is given by

where the second equality follows from the production function, the third equality follows from
the output demand function, and the final equality defines G (st). Labor market equilibrium

J
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requires that labor supply LS(st) in (12) equal labor demand Ld(st) In (13). This equality
determines an equilibrium real wage.
Figure 1 illustrates labor market equilibria before and after an aggregate demand shock,
where aggregate output Y is a shift variable. In Figure 1, a change in aggregate output from

Yo to Y1 leads to a shift in both labor supply and labor demand curves. The labor supply
equation (12) reveals that, for a given labor demand, a one percent increase in Y causes an
equal percentage increase in real wage (from point A to B in the diagram). The labor demand
equation (13) reveals that an increase in Y causes a one-for-one increase in labor demand, thus
shifts the labor demand curve to the right and further pushes up real wage via moving along
the new labor supply curve (from point B to C). By taking total differentiation of (12), we
find that the magnitude of this second increase in real wage equals

e== VllL/v", the household's

relative risk aversion in labor hours. The total percentage increase in real wage due to a one
percent increase in aggregate output (from A to C) is then given by
E

w,

8(W/F) Y
= 8Y (W/P)

Y -

= 1

+ e.

Given that the household is risk averse in labor hours, i.e. ,

(14)

e > 0,

Ew,Y

is necessarily larger

than one. Thus, real wage rises by more than aggregate output does. Facing such a large
increase in real marginal cost, each firm fully raises its price whenever it gets the chance to set
a new price. Price level thus rises quickly and the output response is short-lived.
This inability of the staggered price mechanism is in contrast to the potential of the staggered wage mechanism in generating persistence. Nonetheless, confusion of the two mechanisms
may arise from the apparent similarity of the linearized decision rules in the two models. The
log-linearized price equation in the current model, by setting {3
N -l

Pt =

L

j=l

N-l

bjPt-j

+ Et

L

j=l

bjpt+j

+

N

~ 1Et

= 1, is given by
N-l

L

Yt+j,

j=O

which is apparently identical to the log-linearized wage equation (8) in the staggered wage
model, with

Wt

being replaced by Pt everywhere. Indeed, the coefficients bj are identical in

the two equations so that the intertemporal backward- and forward-looking effects seem to
work in the same way under the two mechanisms. However, the parameter

r is determined in

different ways across the two models so that the optimal wage and the optimal price responses
to changes in aggregate demand conditions are different. In the staggered price model,

r is

J
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the steady state counter part of tw,Y and is given by
(15)
where

f, is

households' steady state relative risk aversion in labor hours. Given that

parameter, is here necessarily larger than one and increases with

f,.

f, > 0,

the

Thus, the staggered price

model is not capable of generating persistence.
To make this no-persistence result more transparent, we solve for the equilibrium output
dynamics when N = 2, and the solution is again given by (3). Since, is here greater than
one, the value of a is necessarily negative and there is no persistence.
In light of (9) and (15), as long as there is an intertemporal smoothing incentive in labor
supply (i.e.,

f, >

0), the key persistence parameter (,) in the two models is linked to prefer-

ences and technologies in two different ways, rendering the two models different potentials in
generating persistence.

5

Models with Intertemporal Links

As our analytical results in Sections 3 and 4 have shown, the staggered price mechanism does
not contribute to generating persistence while the staggered wage mechanism potentially can.
J

As shown in CKlv'I (1998), the inability of the staggered price model in generating persistence
is robust when there are intertemporal links such as capital accumulation and interest rate
sensitive money demand. To assess the quantitative contribution of the staggered wage mechanism to generating persistent real effects of monetary shocks, we examine a calibrated version
of the staggered wage model with these intertemporallinks. We find that the staggered wage
mechanism does play an important role in generating persistence.
We describe the formal model, the computation methods, and the calibration strategies
in the Appendix, and present the main results in this section. Since analytical solutions are
difficult to obtain, we resort to numerical methods to solve the log-linearized equilibrium conditions. The calibrated parameter values are shown in Table 1. All parameters are calibrated
using standard methods as in CKM (1998), except for the elasticity of substitution among
differentiated labor skills in the staggered wage model (a).
micro-studies by Griffin (1992, 1996).8

We set a = 6 in light of the
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In what follows, we report the impulse response functions of the models' key variables
following a monetary shock. The money supply process is given by M(st)

= p,(st)M(st-l),

and the money growth rate follows the process

(16)
where 0

< p < 1, and

ct has an i.i.d. normal distribution with zero mean and finite variance.

To compute the impulse responses, we choose the magnitude of the innovation term in the
money growth rate (the

Ct

term) so that money stock rises by 1% one year after the shock.

Figure 2 plots the impulse response functions of output in the two models with N

=

4.

In the staggered price model, the output initially rises, and then returns to steady state as
soon as the initial contract expires (i.e., one year after the shock). This finding is consistent
with CKM (1998). In contrast, the output response in the staggered wage model is much more
persistent. To measure the rnagnitude of persistence, we define a "contract multiplier" as the
ratio of the output response at the end of the initial contract duration to that in the impact
period. The contract multiplier is negative under the staggered price mechanism whereas it is
about 40% under the staggered wage mechanism.
Figures 3 and 4 display the impulse responses of key variables in the two models. In both
models, consumption, investment, and employment are all pro cyclical. Investment is more
volatile than output, which in turn is more volatile than consumption. The nominal interest
rate and inflation rate are both pro cyclical. Interestingly, all these are standard features of a
monetary business cycle model without nominal rigidities (e.g. Cooley and Hansen (1995)).
Except for the lack of "liquidity effect ," these features are broadly consistent with the business
cycle facts in the U.S. economy. Nonetheless, the two models' equilibrium predictions differ
in two key aspects. First, the impulse responses of both real and nominal variables in the
staggered wage model are more persistent than those in the staggered price model. Second,
real wage is strongly pro cyclical in the staggered price model, while it is weakly countercyclical
in the staggered wage model. Evidence on the cyclicality of real wage is mixed. As surveyed
by Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), existing empirical studies do not suggest systematically
pro cyclical or countercyclical real wages. 9
Finally, Figure 5 displays the impulse response of output in the staggered wage model with
different values of a and different N. In addition to our benchmark value of a = 6, higher
values of this parameter are reported in the literature. For example, Erceg (1997) uses a value

/
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of 10, Kim (1996) obtains an estimate of 12, and Koenig (1997) argues that
as 20. As shown in Figure 5, a larger

(5

(5

can be as high

leads to flatter output responses and hence more

persistence. Additionally, a larger N also produces more persistence. It is interesting to note
that, the staggered wage model is able to generate a hump-shaped output response for

(5

values

within the range reported in the literature. The findings here confirm the analytical results
in Section 3, and are consistent with Taylor's (1980) original insights that a larger degree of
asynchronization in wage setting (i.e., a larger N) generates more output persistence.
To summarize, the basic insights elaborated by our analytical solutions in Sections 3 and 4
stand up to the incorporation of such intertemporallinks as capital accumulation and interest
rate sensitive money demand. While the staggered price mechanism by itself does not contribute to, the staggered wage mechanism plays an important role in generating persistence.

6

Conclusion

We have shown that, with optimizing individuals, staggered wage contracts and staggered
price contracts have different implications on persistence. Although the dynamic price setting
and the dynamic wage setting equations in the two models are apparently identical, the key
parameter that governs persistence in the two equations is linked to preferences and technologies in different ways, resulting in different predictions on how aggregate output responds to
monetary shocks. While the staggered price model by itself does not contribute to, the staggered wage model plays an important role in generating persistence. The difference between
the two mechanisms cannot possibly be uncovered unless individuals' optimizing behaviors are
explicitly modeled.
We have focused on distinguishing the two mechanisms in their abilities of generating
persistence, and have not attempted to propose a single friction model that is able to fully
account for the dynamic output responses to monetary shocks. As suggested by Christiano,
et. al (1997) , it is unlikely for a single-friction model to provide a complete account of the
real effects of monetary shocks. To provide such an account , a combination of frictions is
required. Our findings in this paper suggest that, in such a multi-friction model, staggered
wage contracts can be an important contributing mechanism.

J
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Appendix
This appendix presents a model of staggered wage contracts with capital accumulation. The
model is identical to the model in Section 3 with two exceptions. First, firms' production
requires both labor and capital as inputs. Second, households' problems now involve decisions
on capital accumulation. The model of staggered price contracts with capital accumulation is
not formally presented here because it is similar to CKM (1998).

A.I. The Model
We begin with firms' problems. Each firm has access to a Cobb-Douglas production function
(17)
where 0 < a < I , K(st ) is the capital stock at st, alld L (st)
a composite of labor services.

" 0'1
[/

L ("'l, ,,' t)~
d'] O"~I
"
0

'/,

Let Rk (st) denote the nominal rental rate on capital.

minimizing the production cost Rk(st)K

a=

By

+ fa1 W(i, st)L(i)di subject to (17), we obtain the

demand functions for L(st), K(st), and L(i, st).

MC(st) = aW(st)1-nRk(st)n, where

•
IS

The resulting marginal cost function is

a- n (l - a)n-1. Profit maximization implies that

price equals marginal cost, that is,
J

(18)
We next specify households' problems. The utility function is the same as in the baseline
model. The budget constraint is now given by

P(st)C(i, i) + P( st) J(i, st)

[1 + ¢ (:r;:'S~~l)) ] + #, D(st+llst)B(i, sHl) + M(i, st)

< W(i, st)Ld(i, st) + Rk(st)K(i, st- 1) + IT(i, st) + B(i , st) + M(i, st-1) + T(i, st ),

(19)

where I(i, st) and ¢( I(i, st)/ K(i, st-1)) are the investment and the capital adjustment cost of
household i in st, respectively. Capital accumulation is governed by
(20)
where 8 E (0, 1) is a capital depreciation rate.
Household i maximizes utility choosing C(i, st), I(i, st), M(i, st), and B(i, st+1), subject to
(19)-(20) and a borrowing constraint B(i, st) 2: -B for some large positive number B, taking
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prices P(st), W(st), Rk(st), and D(st+1Ist) and initial conditions K(i, S-l) , M(i, s-l), and
B(i, sO) as given. If the household is a member of the cohort that can set new wages, it also

chooses a nominal wage W (i, st) for its contract periods. To simplify notation, we denote by

Q( i, st) the investment-capital ratio J( i, st) j K (i, st-1) and by H( Q) the effective cost of capital
1 + ¢( Q)

+ Q¢' (Q).

The first order conditions are

Uc(i , st)
Um(i , st)jP(st)
D(st+l lst)
Uc(i, st)H(Q(i, st))

A(i , st)P(st),
A(i, st) - (3

L

(21)

7f(st+llst)A(i, st+l),

(22)

(37f( st+ll st) A( i, st+l) j A( i, st),

(3

L

(23)

7f(st+1Ist)Uc(i, st+1){Rk(st+1)jP(st+1)

t+N-1
8Ld(' T)
""'
""' ~T-t 7f (STit)
L- L- tJ
S [-Vil ('l,. s T)] 8W(i'l, Sst)
T=t ST
,
t+N-l
=
(3T-t7f(S Tlst)A(i, sT)Ld( i, s T)(l - 0'),
T=t ST

+

(24)

(25)

L L

where Uc(i, st), Um(i, st), and - Vi(i, st) denote the marginal utility of consumption, real money
balances, and leisure, respectively, A(i, st) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the
budget constraint, and 7f(sT lst) = 7f(ST)j7f(st) is the conditional probability of ST given st, for
T

2: t.
Equations (21) -(24) are standard first order conditions with respect to the household's

choice of consumption, nlOney balances, bond holdings, and capital investment, respectively.
Equation (25) corresponds to the wage setting rule. The left-hand side of this equation is the
expected present value of marginal utility gains due to an increase in wage and thus reduced
labor hours during the contract periods, while the right-hand side is the expected present
value of marginal utility losses due to unemployed hours and thus a lower wage income. The
wage is set to balance the gains and the losses at the margin.

Since there are complete

contingent asset markets, each household's consumption and money balance decisions depend
only on initial distributions of wealth. Without loss of generality, we assume that the initial
holdings of wealth are identical across households. This assumption, along with the assumption
that consumption and leisure are additively separable in the utility function, implies that
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the equilibrium consumption and money balances are identical across households for each
realization of st. That is, C(i, st)

= C(st) and M(i, st) = M(st). In consequence, A(i, st)

=

A(st) for all i, and thus the wage decision rule implied by (25) depends only on aggregate
variables.
Capital market clearing requires that J~l K(i, st-l) di
implies that

C(st) + J(st)

[1+

q\

(~~~~1)

)] =

= K(st), and goods rnarket clearing
K( sty' L( i)l-a.

(26)

Note that, in each period t, firms' decisions on capital demand are made after the realization
of st, while the capital stock available for rent is chosen by households at st-l.
The rest of the optimization conditions is the same as in Section 3. Given the money supply
process (16), an equilibrium can be defined analogously.

A.2. The Computation
We now describe how to compute equilibrium decision rules. With appropriate substitutions,
the equilibrium conditions can be reduced to three equations, including a wage setting equation, a capital Euler equation, and a Inoney demand equation. The decision variables are
current wages, aggregate consumption, and aggregate capital stock. We focus on a symmetric
equilibrium in which households in the same cohort make identical decisions. In a symmetric
equilibrium, a household's wage decision depends only on the time at which it can set a new
wage but not on the index of its labor service. Thus, we have W(i, st) = W(st) for all i and
the wage index is given by

We now rewrite (25) as an equation in the three decision variables. To begin, we first use
(4) to express Ld(i, ST) and 8Ld(i, sT)/8W(i, st) by W(st), W(ST), and L(ST). We then use
(21) to replace A(i, ST) by C(ST), M(ST), and P(ST). Finally, we use (18), (20), (26), and (27)
to express P(ST), L(ST), and W(ST) by W(ST), C(ST), and K(ST), for

T =

t, t+ 1, ... , t+N-l.

We also use (18) and the relation Rk(st) = (a/(l - a))(L(st)/K(st-l))W(st) (derived from
firms' cost-miniInization) to substitute for P(st) and Rk(st) in (22) and (24), respectively.
Given the Markov Inoney supply process (16), a stationary equilibrium in this economy
consists of stationary decision rules which are functions of the state of the economy. In each

J

period t, there are N - 1 prevailing wages that were set in period t - N
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+ 1 through period t - 1

due to staggered wage contracts. Thus, the state of the economy in period t must record the
wages set in the previous N -1 periods in addition to the beginning-of-period capital stock and
the exogenous money growth rate. To induce stationarity, we divide all wages by the money
stock. Thus, the state at st is given by [W(st-N+1)/ M(st), ... , W (st-1) / M(st), K(st-1), f.L(st)].

A.3. The Calibration
In both models, the capital adjustment cost function is given by ¢(1/ K) = (7jJ /2) (1/ K)2 and
the utility function takes the form U(C,M/P,L) = 10g[bC V

+ (1-

b)(M/PYP /v + 1]log(l-

L). The parameters to be calibrated include the subjective discount factor (3, the preference
parameters b,

LJ,

and 1], the capital share

0,

the depreciation rate 6, the adjustment cost

parameter 7jJ, the monetary policy parameter p, and the technology parameter (i.e.,
the staggered wage model and

e in

(J"

in

the staggered price model). The calibrated values are

summarized in Table 1.
In our baseline model, we set N = 4 so that a period in the model corresponds to a quarter.
Following the standard business cycle literature, we choose (3 = 0.96 1 / 4 . To assign values for b
and

LJ,

we use the implied money demand equation

M(st))

log ( P(st)
where R( st) =

=

1
-1 _ LJ log

(b)
t
1 _ b + 10g(C(s )) -

1
(R(st) - 1)
1 _ LJ log
R(st)
,

(Lst+ 1 D (st+11 st)) -1 is the gross nominal interest rate. The regression of this

equation as perforrned in CKM (1998) implies that

LJ

=

-1.56 and b = 0.98 for quarterly

U.S. data with a sarnple range from quarter one in 1960 to quarter four in 1995. The serial
correlation parameter p of money growth rate is set to 0.57, based on quarterly U.S. data on

M1 from quarter three in 1959 to quarter two in 1995 (see also CKM (1998)).
We next choose

0

=

0.33 and 6 = 1 - 0.92 1 / 4 so that the baseline model predicts an

annualized capital-output ratio of 2.6 and an investment-output ratio of 0.21. The parameter
1] is selected to match an average share of time allocated to market activity of 1/3, as in
most business cycle studies. We adjust 7jJ so that the model predicts a standard deviation of
aggregate investment to be 3.23 times as large as that of output, in accordance with the U.S.
data. Following CKIvI (1998), we set
steady state luarkup of 11 %.

e=

10 in the staggered price model, corresponding to a

/
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Finally, we set a = 6 in the staggered wage model, based on the empirical studies by Griffin
(1992, 1996) , who uses dis aggregated firm-level data to estimate the elasticity of substitution
among differentiated labor skills.
In the sensitivity analysis conducted in Section 5, we vary the degree of asynchronization
in wage setting, N, as well as the labor substitutability parameter, a. We adjust (3, TJ, b,

8, 'ljJ, and p accordingly so as to keep unchanged the labor-leisure ratio , the capital-output
ratio, the investment-output ratio, the relative volatility of investment, and the quarterly
serial correlation of money growth rate. In particular, we set (3

=

O.96 1/ N

,

8

=

1 - O.92 1 / N

,

and p = O.574 / N , and adjust b, TJ, and 'ljJ whenever we vary N or a.
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NOTES

1. Although rnodels with information lags and price stickiness are shown to be quite suc-

cessful in generating output fluctuations driven by monetary shocks, the resulting effects
are usually contemporaneous rather than persistent. See, for example, Lucas (1972),
Lucas and Woodford (1993), Rotemberg (1996), and Yun (1996).
2. This view has recently been emphasized by Taylor (1999), who states that "the equations
are essentially the same for wage setting and price setting."
3. Our purpose here is to compare the abilities of two alternative mechanisms with staggered
nominal contracts in the spirit of Taylor (1980) and CKM (1998) in generating longlasting endogenous persistence with a short duration of exogenous stickiness. We thus
follow these authors and assume time-dependent wage setting and price setting rules.
4. We assume, without loss of generality, that the initial distribution of wealth is identical
across all households.
5. Since the labor demand elasticity (Y is greater than one, a lower wage W(i, st) is associated
with higher labor income.
6. The wage decision rule (8) also reveals that the effect of'Y on persistence can be reinforced
by the nurnber of cohorts. A larger N tends to darnpen wage response to changes in
current and future aggregate outputs.
7. Notice the sirnilarity of this equation to the price setting rule in Taylor's (1980) simple
model described by (1) and (2).
8. The estimate of (Y in Griffin (1992, 1996) is based on firm level data representing different
industries. As noted by Griffin (1992), the estimate tends to be biased downward for
two reasons: (i) all firms in the data set are subject to Affirmative Action which restricts
labor substitutability, and (ii) the employment data does not include employee characteristics such as workers' age, experience, and education. Griffin (1996) shows that, when
Affirmative Action is explicitly accounted for, the estimate of (Y is about 6.
9. Since monetary shocks are the only driving force of fluctuations in our models , to evaluate
the models' ernpirical relevance, we need to compare the models' predictions on real wage
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behavior with the response of real wage to monetary shocks in the data. The evidence
is mixed. Some empirical studies find that real wage is acyclical or weakly procyclical in
response to monetary shocks (e.g. Christiano, et al. (1999)), while some other studies
suggest the opposite. For example, Bernanke and Carey (1996) find that, using data for
22 countries during the Great Depression, nominal wages adjusted quite slowly to falling
prices, resulting in rising real wages amid the dramatic reduction in employment and
output. As documented by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), monetary shocks played an
important role during the Great Depression. In a survey on the cyclicality of real wages,
Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) note that the real wage cyclicality depends on various
factors including the choice of sample periods. For instance, they find that there were
roughly synchronized declines in the growth rate of industrial production and real wages
in the early to middle 1970s, but in the 1981-82 period, industrial production fell while
the real wage growth rate actually increased. It is well known that there was a major
monetary contraction during the early 1980s. Our model of staggered wage contracts
is more flexible than it appears to be in accommodating the real wage cyclicality. For
example, one way to induce acyclical real wages is to add price staggering on top of
wage staggering, as in Erceg (1997). But as we have shown elsewhere (Huang and Liu
(1999)), adding price staggering in the staggered wage model does not help magnify the
J

persistence.
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Table 1.
Calibrated Parameter Values
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Figure l:-Real wage response to an aggregate demand shock
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aThe literature provides a wide range of
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values. In addition to Griffin's (1992, 1996)

reported (]" valu e of a bout 6, whi ch is the benchmark value we use, other values are used
in the literature. For exampl e, Erceg (1997) uses a value of 10, Kim (1996) obtains an
estimate of 12, and Koenig (1997) argues that (]" can be as high as 20 . The figures here
display the impulse response of output for alternative (]" values within this range.
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Staggered price and staggered wage contracts are commonly viewed as similar mechanisms in generating persistent real effects of monetary shocks. In this paper, we distinguish
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Introduction

How rnonetary policy shocks affect business cycle duration has been a challenging issue concerning economists and policy makers. Recent empirical studies such as Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1999) reveal that monetary shocks can have long-lasting effects on real activities. Yet, it has been a difficult task to identify monetary transmission mechanisms that can
contribute to generating such effects.l
In a seminal paper, Taylor (1980) proposes a staggered wage mechanism to help solve this
persistence issue. In his model, nominal wages are set in a staggered fashion. That is, not
all wage decisions are made at the same time, and each wage, after being set, is fixed for a
short period of time such as a year. As summarized in Taylor (1999), there is much empirical
evidence that price contracts and wage contracts are staggered. Taylor (1980) shows that this
staggered wage mechanisrn can lead to endogenous wage inertia and thereby persistence in
employment movernents following a temporary shock. He states the intui tion as follows:
Because of the staggering, some firms will have established their wage rates
prior to the current negotiations, but others will establish their wage rates in future
periods. Hence, when considering relative wages, firms and unions must look both
forward and backward in time to see what other workers will be paid during their
/

own contract period. In effect, each contract is written relative to other contracts,
and this causes shocks to be passed on from one contract to another ... contract
formation in this model generates an inertia of wages which parallels the persistence
of unemployment.
More recently, Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (CKM) (1998) carry this intuition to a general
equilibrillll environment. But, perhaps surprisingly, they find that a staggered price mechanism by itself carmot generate persistent real effects following monetary shocks, an apparent
puzzle in light of Taylor's insights. There are two interpretations of this puzzle. On one hand,

CKM (1998) suggest that it is difficult to explain persistence based on staggered nominal contracts in a general equilibrium framework, and "we should look elsewhere for mechanisms to
generate persistence. " On the other hand, Taylor (1999) conjectures that, '(the findings of
Chari, Kehoe , and McGrattan (1998) may indicate that the monopolistic competition (stationary market power) model may not be sufficient as a micro economic foundation." Behind
2

2
that the monopolistic competition (stationary market power) model may not be sufficient as a

micro economic foundation." Behind the two arguments seems to be a common perception that
a staggered price mechanism and a staggered wage mechanism are embodied with the same
implications on persistence: either that they both contribute to generating persistence or that
neither does

SO.2

The purpose of this paper is to suggest a third interpretation of the persistence puzzle. We
find that a general equilibrium model along the line of CKM (1998) , incorporating staggered
wage contracts rather than staggered price contracts, is able to generate substantial persistence. Thus , staggered wage contracts are an important contributing mechanism in generating
persistent real effects of monetary shocks , even when the underlying wage setting rule is derived frorn the standard monopolistic competition framework. The two models have different
implications on persistence because, in a general equilibrium environment, the key parameter
that governs persistence in the dynamic price setting and the dynamic wage setting equations
is a function of the underlying preferences and technologies of the economy. Al though the two
equations are apparently identical, this functional form and thereby the value of the persistence
parameter differ across the two mechanisms.
To facilitate the comparison of the two mechanisms, we construct two rnodels in a symmetric
way. The first rnodel features perfectly competitive goods markets, monopolistically competitive labor markets, and households endowed with differentiated labor skills setting nominal
wages. The second model, on the other hand, features perfectly competitive labor markets,
monopolistically cornpetitive go ods markets, and firms producing differentiated goods setting
prices. In the spirit of Taylor (1980), we assume that wages and prices are set in a staggered
fashion. 3 Following the lead of CKM (1998), we derive the wage setting and the price setting
rules from households' and firms' optimizing decisions and thus link these decision rules to
the underlying preferences and technologies in the models. We show that a critical parameter governing persistence is the elasticity of relative wage (or price) with respect to aggregate
demand in the wage (or price) equation. A greater value of this parameter corresponds to
less persistence, because it implies a larger response of wage (or price) decisions to aggregate
demand shocks, and thus a faster adjustment of wage (or price) index and a quicker return
of aggregate output to steady state. Under the staggered wage mechanism, the value of this
parameter is necessarily less than one, and decreases with both the elasticity of substitution
among differentiated labor skills in the production technology and the degree of relative risk
aversion in labor hours in households' preferences. In contrast, the value of this parameter
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